Advice and Consent:
The Role of the United States Senate
in the Judicial Selection Process
Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.f
Among all the responsibilities of a United States Senator,
none is more important than the duty to participate in the process
of selecting judges and justices to serve on the federal courts.
While this duty is typically discharged routinely and in some degree of obscurity, the Senate's deliberations on President Reagan's
nominations to the federal bench attracted a great deal of public
attention during the Ninety-Ninth Congress. The issue before the
Senate in each case is never simply whether or not to confirm a
particular nomination. Instead, the debate always implicates a far
broader question: what is the role of the Senate in the crucial but
little understood process that we refer to by the constitutional
shorthand of "advice and consent"?
The Senate's duty in this sphere is extraordinary. Most other
senatorial decisions are subject to revision, either by the Congress
itself or by the executive branch. Statutes can be amended, budgets rewritten, appropriations deferred or rescinded. But a judicial
confirmation is different.
When the framers of the Constitution decided that federal
judges "shall hold their offices during good Behaviour," and may
be removed only by the rarely utilized process of impeachment,
they guaranteed respect for the principle of judicial independence.
Their decision also meant, however, that the vote to confirm a judicial nominee must express the Senate's confidence in the nominee's ability to decide the burning legal controversies not only of
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the day but of future decades as well. A senator serving in the
100th Congress cannot know what the legal issues of the twentyfirst century will be; they may bear little resemblance to those that
currently animate the nation. We can be certain, however, that
judges appointed to the federal bench during the 100th Congress
will have to decide those distant controversies.
This short essay explores the meaning and implications of this
weighty duty from the perspective of one who has been involved in
the process. I first investigate the constitutional foundation of the
duty to "advise and consent," then turn to the practical and political mechanisms that have been built on that foundation. Finally, I
offer some recommendations for improvements in the current process of nominating and approving judges.
I.
An examination of the Senate's role in the process of choosing
the federal judiciary should start by going to the source. The Senate's duty to "advise and consent" derives from article II, section 2
of the Constitution, which provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law.
The Constitution tells us no more than this. It does not tell
the Senate how to assess a nominee to the federal bench. It imposes no job qualifications-of age, citizenship, or even admission
to the bar. It does not list the intellectual or temperamental qualities the nation should demand of its judges. It offers no guidelines
for acceptance or rejection. The Constitution indicates only that
the appointment of federal judges is too important to be reposed in
the hands of one branch alone, and that the Senate has two distinct roles: to advise the president in his selection process and to
consent to-or, by implication, reject-the president's choice.
Legend has it that in the course of debating the method for
appointing judges, Ben Franklin suggested that Supreme Court
nominations be made by lawyers. Franklin thought that practitioners would want to eliminate their strongest competitors and, as a
result, would nominate only the most able lawyers. More authoritative sources indicate that early drafts of the Constitution empowered the Senate to appoint judges. Alexander Hamilton, however, anticipated the deficiencies in that arrangement. He proposed
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that the president nominate and appoint judges and that the Senate "reject or approve" these candidates. Hamilton's proposal was
ultimately accepted, but with one significant modification: the
words "reject or approve" were changed to "advice and consent."
This modification ensured a role for the Senate in both the nomination and confirmation of judges.
To illuminate the policy behind the terse words of article II,
we may turn to the The FederalistPapers. In FederalistNo. 76,
Hamilton argues the case for dividing the appointment power between the president and the Senate. The president should have the
power to nominate, Hamilton reasons, because "one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal, or
perhaps even of superior discernment." But Hamilton also predicted that "the necessity of . . . concurrence [by the Senate]
would have a powerful, though in general, a silent operation. It
would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." Although Hamilton recognized that Senate rejection of a nomination probably
would be a rare occurrence, he concluded that the Senate's participation was an essential part of the constitutional plan "to promote
a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union."
Although the Senate's power of consent has been in the spotlight recently, little attention has focused on the duty to advise on
judicial nominations. The Federalist does not clearly distinguish
advice from consent. Certainly, as Hamilton argues, the power to
nominate is the president's alone; and while a senator is in an excellent position to know which individuals within his constituency
are best qualified to be federal judges, the president obviously
need not heed his "advice." But both historical tradition and the
practical considerations that flow from the ultimate requirement of
Senate concurrence have strengthened the role of senators in recommending nominees. In the past, senators have been able to increase the likelihood that their recommendations will be respected
by extending to one another a "senatorial courtesy." The "blue
slip" system has assured that a nominee rarely will be confirmed
over the objection of either senator from the nominee's state.
Many have argued that this arrangement, while providing political
leverage to senators, does little to ensure that only the most able
candidates became judges.
Senators can, however, effectively advise the president on judi-
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cial nominations in ways that do more than simply reward favors
or loyalty. One such means is by establishing committees within
senators' states to recommend candidates on the basis of merit. Increasingly, senators solicit the advice of panels of lawyers, academics, and community leaders before recommending to the president
individuals to fill vacancies on district courts in their home states.
In my experience, this system has proven excellent at minimizing
the partisan complications that may engulf the nominating process, and at improving the quality of nominees. Even though the
work product of any one panel varies with the quality and professionalism of its membership, these committees generally have been
worthwhile and should be encouraged.
The Senate's second function, that of consenting to (or rejecting) nominees, is equally important and more visible. The Senate cannot automatically consent to the nomination without abdicating its constitutional responsibility. The Constitution gives the
Senate the consent power not as a mechanical formality, but as an
integral part of the structure of government. If anything, the Senate's role has become even more important in recent years as federal court rulings have had a burgeoning impact in wide-ranging
areas of policy. If the Senate does not take its role seriously, it will
lose its effectiveness as, in Hamilton's words, "a considerable and
salutary restraint upon the conduct" of the president. And if, as
the result of a breakdown in the process of advice and consent, an
unwise appointment is made, the people, who have the most at
stake, will know whom to blame. As Hamilton wrote in Federalist
No. 77, "the executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace."
Hamilton's discussion of the appointment power is informed
by an acute psychological insight that remains valid today. More
than any other business of the Senate, the consideration of nominations turns on personalities as much as on policies. Hamilton
gives several reasons why the Senate would be unlikely to reject a
nominee. The first is based on practical politics: the president
would simply make another nomination, with which the Senate
might be equally, or even more, unhappy. But Hamilton gives another reason in FederalistNo. 77 "as their dissent might cast a
kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the
appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused,
where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal."
As Hamilton recognizes, the Senate's action upon a nomina-
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tion is strongly colored by how senators feel about two people. The
first, of course, is the nominee. Even a senator who is convinced
that a nominee is not well-suited for the bench must think twice
about the stigma that rejection of the nomination may cast upon a
man or woman who, in almost every case, is intelligent, hard-working, honest, and well-intentioned. At some point, of course, the
concern for the individual pales in comparison with the interests of
society in competent adjudication. And that point is more quickly
reached as the power of federal courts increases. Yet these decisions usually are not clear-cut; one can seldom say with complete
confidence that a nominee would make a bad judge.
Looming larger in the Senate's consideration of a nominee is
the president of the United States. The choice he has made in
nominating an individual to the federal bench is imbued with the
incomparable prestige of the presidency. As Hamilton wisely predicted, rejection of a nominee is inevitably a reflection on the president's judgment. No senator easily dismisses the fact that the
nominee has the president's endorsement.
However, it is not the president or the president's qualifications to which a senator must give "advice and consent." A senator
is only one of 100 million voters when the choice of a president is
made. In the context of judicial appointments, however, a senator
is one of 100 and is obligated to pass judgment on the qualification
of the president's nominee.
An independent judiciary demands that the nominee present
no platform, expound no particular ideology, represent no constituency, and submit to no political litmus test. It also demands that
those who nominate and appoint judges do not seek simply to affirm and perpetuate their political viewpoint in their nominations
and appointments. A judge must take his seat on the bench confident that he is not expected to decide cases in any particular way
because of the views of the leaders of either of the other two
branches. Instead, he must emerge from the nomination process
knowing that the president and Senate have confidence that he
will preside with only one unalterable loyalty, to the Constitution,
and with only one purpose, to assure the individual standing
before him a judgment based upon the law of the land.
A president is entitled to reflect his judicial and political philosophy in his judicial nominations. If a nominee is an intelligent
and capable individual, and is qualified by reason of temperament,
training in the law, experience at the bar, and commitment to community service, no senator will object to the nomination simply because the nominee shares the president's political orientation. His-
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tory provides ample testimony to this fact, of which the unanimous
confirmation of Justice Scalia is the most recent example. If, however, it should become apparent that an individual has been selected because of his philosophical orientation rather than his professional competence, the Senate has a duty to intervene.
A president can substantially eliminate ideology from the debate if he selects a nominee whose competence is unimpeachable.
Again, Justice Scalia provides a good example: while his strong
conservative views were well-known, they offered little or no obstacle to his confirmation. If the Senate were to reject a good nomination for reasons that were obviously purely ideological, public censure of its action would be forthcoming, censure that, in the words
of FederalistNo. 77, would be "aggravated by the consideration of
their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive."
The Senate must be convinced that a nominee is impeccably
competent. But competence alone is not sufficient. It is not enough
that a nominee be skilled in legal argument and knowledgeable
about legal doctrine, and that she be able to write clearly and
forcefully. A candidate for the federal bench must, as Hamilton
wrote in FederalistNo. 78, "unite the requisite integrity with the
requisite knowledge." The nominee also must exhibit a strength of
character and a range of vision that will help her look beyond the
world that exists on the day on which she is nominated. Thus, the
character of a nominee is neither tangential nor irrelevant to her
fitness for the bench.
II.
As the Senate embarks on its third century, its role in the judicial nomination process merits increased attention. My reflections on eighteen years as a participant in that process have led me
to make a few suggestions for improvement.
First, the Senate should reassess the importance of its constitutional role with respect to judicial nomination, and should consider allocating more resources to the performance of that role.
The Senate Judiciary Committee is structured primarily for the
consideration of legislation. But there may be times-the NinetyNinth Congress, I believe, was one of them-when the significance
of the Committee's actions on its executive calendar of nominations rivals, or even outweighs, its legislative agenda. The Committee should be confident that it is devoting enough funds, staff, and
time to the consideration of a nomination. Midway though the
Ninety-Ninth Congress, the Committee adopted a timetable
designed to ensure that there would be adequate opportunity for a
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thorough investigation even of seemingly routine nominations, and
it provided additional time for those cases meriting special attention. This salutary precedent should be continued. Unlike legislation, action on a judicial nomination processed in haste cannot be
revisited and refined at leisure.
Second, the full Senate should have the opportunity to consider each nomination on a complete record. The recommendation
of the Judiciary Committee no doubt will continue to be of paramount importance to other senators; but they also should have the
opportunity to review the transcripts of hearings on nominations
and to solicit other advice on the merits of the issue before voting.
In this regard, the preparation of a written committee report, including minority views, on controversial or particularly significant
nominations should be the rule, rather than the exception.
Third, the Senate should be more willing to inquire into how
the nominee has come before it in the first place, and it should
adapt its investigative procedures depending on the answer it
receives.
A number of resources are available for such an inquiry. The
Department of Justice should be asked not only to explain its general procedures for selecting nominees, including the role of senatorial advice, but also to offer its assessment of the factors that
best demonstrate a particular nominee's fitness for the bench. The
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary should be encouraged to provide more detail on the evaluation of nominees referred to it, particularly in cases in which it is
less than unanimous in its conclusion that a nominee is qualified.
When a nominee has been recommended by a senator's advisory
committee, that panel should be invited to describe its procedures
and offer the reasons for its conclusions. And particularly when
such a screening mechanism has not been employed, the Judiciary
Committee should undertake an affirmative effort to solicit the
views of the bar of the jurisdiction where the nominee will sit if
confirmed, and of other reputable and representative organizations
that are concerned about the composition of the federal bench.
The goal of these procedures is not to second-guess the judgment of the president in submitting the nomination to the Senate,
but to ensure that the factors underlying that judgment are sufficiently disclosed to permit the Senate to make an informed and
independent evaluation of the president's choice.
III.
Adoption of these procedures in a way that does not unduly
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delay or complicate the confirmation process should help the Senate improve its decisions on judicial nominations. But it would be
folly to claim that procedural reforms can relieve senators of the
burden of a tough decision on a controversial nomination. And the
decision may often be tough indeed, requiring an adherence to
principle in the face of strong partisan pressures. For when the
Senate carries out its function of advice and consent, its first loyalty must be not to the political parties, nor to the president, but
to the people, and to the Constitution they have established.
The paramount constitutional duty of the Senate in the process of advice and consent is to satisfy itself that the nominee
before it is fully qualified, by virtue of education, experience, integrity, and character, to be granted a lifetime commission to sit in
judgment upon the liberties and the legal rights of the American
people. Before being confirmed for a seat on the district court, a
nominee must be fully prepared to administer equal justice under
the law in the way that distinguishes our legal system from that of
any other country. Since judges of the courts of appeals will, in
practice, sit as the court of last resort in the vast majority of federal cases, they must be judged by particularly stringent standards.
And, of course, in the case of nominations to the Supreme Court,
which has the ultimate authority to interpret and apply the Constitution, the Senate's scrutiny must be exacting in every respect.
Only with vigorous review can the Senate carry out the role envisioned for it by the framers of the Constitution-to provide a "salutary restraint" upon executive power, by permitting the appointment to the federal bench of only those men and women who are
fully qualified to serve there.

